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Juan Valdez and his mule are out of business.
Coffee prices have plummeted to 30-year lows,
hitting a historic bottom of under 39 cents a
pound last October. The price drop, 82 percent
from just four years earlier, forced the National
Federation of Coffee Growers of Colombia to pull
the plug on one of the world’s most successful
marketing icons.
Coffee is not a trivial matter in the developing
world. Coffee is the second-largest export earner
for developing countries, and is the main source
of foreign exchange for several nations, account-
ing for over half of export earnings in countries
like Burundi and Uganda. The situation is 
placing Mr. Valdez’s real-life counterparts under
economic hardship. This downturn directly
affects approximately 20 million families who liveindustry ups and downs6 Regional Review Q2 2002
in the world’s coffee-growing belt—between the tropics of
Cancer and Capricorn—and depend on the beans for their
main source of income. In March, the United Nations’ World
Food Program began an emergency operation to assist 155,000
people in Guatemala where a severe drought that killed sub-
sistence crops coincided with the low coffee prices.
But, for the most part, the circumstances affecting produc-
ers have gone largely unnoticed in the United States, the world’s
largest coffee consumer. Americans have not seen equally steep
price declines for coffee in their supermarket aisles. In fact,
changes in supermarket prices have been obscured by the much
more dramatic expansion in the variety and sophistication of
the coffee menu available to ordinary consumers. From the
humble cup of Joe sprang the latte, the flavor-of-the-day cof-
fee, and the gourmet whole bean—not to mention the iced moc-
cachino. Going for over $2 a cup in many of its gourmet incar-
nations, coffee has become an “affordable luxury.”
The stark contrast between developments in consuming and
producing countries is helping to bolster the arguments for “Fair
Trade” coffee: a movement that guarantees small producers a
fixed minimum price for their product—between two and three
times the unsubsidized market price in the current price slump.
By buying Fair Trade coffee, consumers in developed countries
can feel that they make a positive difference by ensuring good
working conditions and higher prices for farmers in poorer
countries. And the firms that engage in Fair Trade also benefit
by gaining a public relations advantage. But, though this clear-
ly improves the lot of a small share of farmers, long-term op-
tions to protect a larger share of developing-country producers
from tanking prices are far more complicated. 
BETWEEN THE TROPICS OF CANCER
AND CAPRICORN
The economics behind the current drop in coffee prices is as
simple as the solution has proven intractable: supply far out-
strips demand. For the 2001-2002 crop year, for instance, the
U.S. Department of Agriculture estimates world coffee pro-
duction to be almost 116 million 60-kilogram bags, while con-
sumption is estimated to fall short of this figure by around five
million bags (about 600 million pounds). And the excess sup-
ply is widened by already existing stocks, as green coffee can
be stored for up to one year (it quickly goes stale after roasting). 
The coffee trade has been particularly hard hit, but it is part
of a more widespread phenomenon. The average dollar price of
developing countries’ non-oil primary commodity exports fell
by 9 percent in 2001. While coffee prices were down 30 percent
in 2001, cotton prices also declined 20 percent, and rice prices
fell 15 percent with respect to the previous year. A global eco-
nomic slowdown and the existence of large supplies of most
commodities were largely responsible for this wider trend. 
The most visible factor behind this imbalance in the specif-
ic case of coffee is the forceful entry of Vietnam into the trade.
“Ten years ago Vietnam was not even a blip on the screen of the
world coffee market,” says Mark Pendergrast, author of Un-
common Grounds: The History of Coffee and How It Trans-
formed Our World. From the backbenches of coffee production
in 1990, Vietnam has expanded its production by about 1,400
percent over the decade and, by 2000, had displaced Colom-
bia as the world’s second-largest coffee grower after Brazil (see
chart, page 9). 
Many longer-established coffee producers blame the price
plunge on Vietnam’s meteoric rise. Some have pointed accus-
ing fingers at the World Bank, claiming that it encouraged the
growth of the Vietnamese coffee industry. But the World Bank
refutes those accusations. It says it resumed lending to Vietnam
in 1994, after the country’s coffee expansion was already un-
der way and that, though $16 million from a loan to the Agri-
cultural Bank was used to finance coffee farm rehabilitation, it
has not lent directly to the coffee sector. “While $16 million is
a considerable sum of money in a poor rural economy, such an
amount would finance very little, less than 5 percent of Viet-
nam’s coffee expansion,” note Daniele Giovannucci, Panos
Varangis, and Bryan Lewin of the World Bank. 
Moreover, the impressive growth of Vietnam’s coffee sector
is not the only contributor to the coffee glut. According to the
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Brazil has been producing
above 30 million bags a year since 1998-1999—up from 28 and
23 million bags in 1996 and 1997, respectively—and the total
number of coffee trees in Brazil has been growing steadily since
1998-1999. 
Perhaps the clearest culprit in the oversupply of coffee is the
coffee tree itself. It takes at least two years (more for some va-
rieties) for new trees to produce sufficient yields to justify the
costs of harvesting. This means that production is slow to re-
act to price changes. “High prices encourage new planting, but
the new trees do not have any immediate effect on prices, and
there is a tendency towards overplanting,” points out Colby
College sociologist John M. Talbot in an article in Studies in
Comparative International Development. 
Today’s bountiful coffee harvest is to a large extent due to a
series of severe frosts that affected Brazil, the world’s largest cof-
fee producer, in 1994 and led to rising prices that continued
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through the summer of 1997. This encouraged new tree plant-
ings whose harvests are in the market today. 
Once coffee trees are in production, they continue to bear
coffee “cherries” for over a decade. So, when prices fall, the ar-
eas of coffee cultivation don’t shrink accordingly. Coffee grow-
ers limit inputs like fertilizer and this can lower yields. But they
are unlikely to uproot their trees in order to plant something
else. Moreover, governments often pay out subsidies to coffee
growers during periods of low prices to diminish the social and
political consequences of the crisis. The Colombian govern-
ment, for instance, is guaranteeing a $13 subsidy per bag
through the end of September. While this helps tide over the
coffee industry, it also helps prolong the low-price period by
maintaining the coffee supply at unsustainably high levels. 
THE CAFÉ SCENE
Consumers unwittingly bear part of the responsibility for the
glut. World coffee consumption has grown slowly over the past
decade. The vast majority of coffee produced, about 75 percent,
is consumed in developed countries far from the tropics. Un-
deniably, more Americans are drinking gourmet coffees, which
include specialty-grade quality coffees, espresso-based bever-
ages, and iced or cold coffee drinks. From only about 450
gourmet coffee houses in the country in 1991, there were clos-
er to 10,000 of them last year, according to Gary Goldstein of
the National Coffee Association (NCA). But this doesn’t mean
that per-capita coffee consumption is up in this country. In fact,
the number of pounds of coffee consumed per person each year
has been in a steady decline from its historic peak in 1946, ac-
cording to Pendergrast. In 1962, for instance, Americans age
ten or over were consuming an average of 3.1 cups a day. Dur-
ing the 1990s, per-capita consumption stayed between 1.6 and
1.9 cups. While the growth in specialty coffee consumption has
been impressive, it doesn’t come with an equivalent growth in
total coffee imports that would help absorb some of the sur-
plus produced.
The crux of the problem is that, when it comes to coffee (and
other addictive substances), consumers are not very respon-
sive to price changes. For many other goods, changes in retail
prices help clear excess production. But, lower prices don’t lead
to large increases in coffee consumption. By the same token,
most studies indicate that coffee drinkers are loath to restrict
their coffee intake in response to moderate increases in coffee
prices. “A 10 percent increase in price, if taking place in the nor-
mal range of prices, leads to a small (2 to 4 percent) decrease
in the quantity demanded,” points out Harvard professor
Robert Bates in The Political Economy of the World Coffee
Trade. (On the other hand, if coffee prices go up dramatically,
consumers make their unhappiness known. Rising coffee prices
led to Congressional hearings three times in the last century,
according to Pendergrast.)
Taken together, the wide swings in coffee production and the
relatively stable demand by consumers mean that the com-
modity price of coffee, like that of other commodities, fluctu-
ates easily by as much as 50 to 150 percent over a few years. 
WHAT’S IN THE CUP?
How is it then that, at a time of historically low prices, Ameri-
can consumers are paying $2 and more for their lattes?
In part, they are paying for a lot more than coffee beans.
When Americans buy a prepared coffee drink—be it a cap-
puccino or one of its humbler relations—coffee is one of the
smallest components in the product. One pound of beans makes
about 40 cups, according to Don Schoenholt, a well-known
coffee enthusiast and owner of Gillies Coffee Company, based
in Brooklyn, New York. Even if the beverage is made from great
coffee beans—the type that roasters buy for $4 to $5 a pound—
the value of the coffee is about a dime per cup. Just “the cup and
the lid are about 20 cents… the Equal packet often costs the
restaurant as much as the coffee,” says Schoenholt. More im-
portant, the price of each beverage also has to cover the cost of
prime real estate rents, U.S. salaries and benefits for the café
employees, research and development, taxes, and marketing ex-
penses, among others. 
When it comes to roasted coffee sold for home consumption,
the story is slightly different. Coffee accounts for a larger share
of the costs of the final product. And the retail prices of these
products have gone down accordingly. The average store price
for a pound of roast and ground coffee peaked at $4.67 in Au-
gust of 1997 and then steadily declined to $2.86 in March of
2002, the latest figure available from the Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics. Still, retail prices did not fall as much as international
prices in percentage terms: While retail prices fell by 39 per-
cent, international prices saw an 82 percent drop from peak to
trough (see chart, page 12).
Here again, coffee is but one of the ingredients. In his mid-
size specialty roaster wholesaler (about $5 million in annual
sales), Mr. Schoenholt estimates that coffee represents rough-
ly a third of the sale price of his products. Because of this,
changes in the price of coffee result in less-than-proportionate
changes in the retail prices. A 30 percent drop in the interna-
tional price of coffee could lead to only a 10 percent decline in
the price his company charges.
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Coffee companies could still be making higher profits from
the record-low international prices. Given that consumers don’t
rush to the store to buy more coffee when retail prices drop,
firms have little to gain from lowering prices. Moreover, the cof-
fee market is not a perfectly competitive market with many small
companies fighting each other for customers by lowering prices
whenever possible. The bulk of coffee sold in the United States
is dominated by three major companies: Philip Morris, which
through Kraft General Foods owns Maxwell House and other
brands; Procter & Gamble, owner of Folgers among others; and
Sara Lee, owner of Chock full o’Nuts and Hills Brothers.
But determining whether big companies are seeing increased
profits from the drop in coffee prices is extremely difficult. “The
largest players in these markets are huge, diversified transna-
tional corporations, and it is almost impossible to sort out how
much profit they make on their coffee operations as opposed
to their other product lines,” writes Colby sociologist Talbot.
“Information on costs of production can legally be considered
a ‘trade secret,’ which does not have to be disclosed.” 
CUSHIONING THE BLOWS
The current crisis is only the latest, if among the most dra-
matic, in a rocky history of ups and downs. Because these
price swings can be devastating, all players in the market
have sought for ways to buffer themselves, with greater or
lesser success.
The New York Coffee Exchange, for example, was cre-
ated in the 1880s after a steep plunge in the price of coffee
led to widespread ruin and loss among U.S. coffee im-
porters. As the price collapsed, the American firms were left
holding large stocks of coffee that suddenly were worth only
a share of what had been paid for them. Today, large cof-
fee importers and roasters can hedge their exposure to price
swings by buying coffee futures and options in what is now
the Coffee, Sugar, and Cocoa Exchange in New York. 
Coffee-producing countries have tried to protect them-
selves from prices dipping too low by attempting to control
supply. In the early twentieth century, for instance, Brazil
was by far the dominant coffee producer in the world, ac-
counting for almost 70 percent of production, according
to Bates. The Brazilian government began to purchase cof-
fee to limit exports and ensure a high international price.
But, such attempts to control the market have always failed,
as they require a high degree of international cooperation
and the incentives to cheat are always present. When Brazil
attempted it at the turn of the century, the high prices en-
couraged new plantings and the development of the Colombian
coffee industry. Not unlike Vietnam’s entry today, Colombia’s
exports rose from 600,000 bags in 1900 to 3.5 million in 1932.
And Brazil was unable to control the price on its own.
Arguably, the most successful effort to control supply was
through the International Coffee Agreement that was in place
from the early to mid 1960s through 1989. Despite smuggling
and cheating, the quota system helped to moderate coffee prices
from falling too low. To the extent that this effort was success-
ful, it owed its enforcement in large part to the United States,
which joined the agreement as a way to prevent poverty and
communism from destabilizing its Latin American neighbors.
But, as incentives changed, the United States pulled out from
the agreement in 1989, and the volatility of coffee prices in-
creased markedly.
Coffee-producing countries have also attempted to cushion
growers from the swings of the market more directly. “Before
the 1990s, about two-thirds of the coffee-producing countries
counted on government-controlled coffee boards that partici-
pated in extension services, quotas, price controls, coffee tax-
ation or subsidies, marketing, and even credit,” write Varangis
and other World Bank economists. But, beginning in the 1980s,
international organizations like the World Bank and the Inter-
national Monetary Fund exerted pressure on developing coun-
tries to get the government out of the production and market-
ing of products. Though this may have helped diminish
top exporters
Brazil, the largest coffee producer in the world, accounted for 17
percent of all green coffee exports over the past decade. Vietnam
went from growing less than 2 percent of total exports to 13 per-
cent during the same time.
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inefficiency and corruption, there is widespread agreement that
not enough thought was given towards putting safety nets in
place. “Despite increased exports, many producers, who are of-
ten among the poorest, are left in a position of greater expo-
sure to risk, particularly to price risk,” adds Varangis.
Although farmers in developed countries, such as the Unit-
ed States, are also subject to the vicissitudes of weather and oth-
er forces, they have access to generous government subsidies
and market-based tools that help buffer them from the blows.
In many cases, the industry is dominated by corporate behe-
moths that, by virtue of their size, have access to ample sources
of credit and to market products that have been developed to
manage such risks. Additionally, small farmers tend to have di-
versified sources of income, with family members working out-
side the farm (often out of necessity) bringing in a steady salary
independent of the crop’s fortunes. By contrast, the failure and
the dismantlement of past efforts by developing countries to
cushion coffee growers from market risks, have led to the pre-
carious situation they find themselves in today. 
Interestingly, one of the newest strategies to protect devel-
oping countries’ farmers is coming directly from consumers in
industrialized countries. In response to growing concerns over
the fortunes of those who make the products they buy, some
consumers are trying to foster equitable la-
bor practices and better standards of living
through the purchases they make. The “Fair
Trade” movement attempts to eliminate
middlemen in the chain and guarantee a
higher price to growers. As a widely traded
commodity with connections to many de-
veloping countries, coffee was a natural fit
and one of the first items to be targeted. To-
day, American consumers can buy Fair
Trade certified coffee, which is grown by
small owners organized into farmer cooper-
atives that meet the requirements and pass
the inspection of the international Fair Trade
labeling group, TransFair USA. Fair Trade
coffee guarantees farmers a minimum price
of $1.26 a pound. This price was arrived at
by looking at the price pegged by the de-
funct International Coffee Agreement, ac-
cording to Rob Everts, codirector of Equal
Exchange, a coffee importer and roaster
based in Canton, Massachusetts, which
deals exclusively in Fair Trade coffee.
By guaranteeing a minimum price, Fair Trade makes plan-
ning easier and removes a share of the producer’s downside risk
(not necessarily all of it because often farmers are only able to
sell part of their harvest as Fair Trade). But it cannot hope to
solve the problem for all growers. Fair Trade coffee does not pro-
tect the laborers who work on the larger plantations. And, so
far, there is much more coffee that qualifies as Fair Trade cof-
fee than there are buyers willing to pay for it. Fair Trade coffee
is less than 1 percent of the market in the United States and in
Europe, according to Pendergrast. So far, it has been the high-
end coffee shops and some certified roasters that have proven
venues for the product, not the big roasters that account for the
bulk of the trade. 
If the Fair Trade movement grew large enough to significantly
involve the large companies and cover even the daylaborers, the
movement would have to find ways to limit the growth of cof-
fee cultivation, which is encouraged by the guaranteed high
prices. Otherwise, its very success could bring its downfall by,
once again, leading to an oversupply of the product.
UNCERTAIN HORIZON
There are no easy solutions to the problems of low coffee prices,
and no solutions that will take care of everyone. The long his-
Even with the rise of specialty coffee, U.S. per-capita consumption has be
coffee dependence
Some of the world’s smallest coffee producers are heavily dependent
on revenues from coffee exports. In contrast, semiconductors, the
largest export earner for the United States, only accounted for 5.6
percent of total exports in 2000.
VALUE OF GREEN AND COFFEE AS EXPORTS AS
ROASTED COFFEE % OF TOTAL % OF
EXPORTS (US$1,000) EXPORTS GDP
Burundi 30,951 56 8
Uganda 308,721 52† 12†
Rwanda 17,402 27* 6*
Ethiopia 255,336 26 16**
Honduras 410,039 16 42
Nicaragua 134,826 15 37
Guatemala 575,357 15 20
Ecuador 24,349 11 42
Papua New Guinea 164,305 10* 47*
El Salvador 340,342 9 28
*1999 data    **1998 data   †1996 data
sources: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, International Monetary Fund.en in steady decline since 194812 Regional Review Q2 2002
tory of price swings serves as a stark reminder of the difficul-
ties in finding lasting solutions to the instability of coffee prices
and the income of the farmers who grow and depend on it. And
there is reason to think that the current trough in coffee prices
may be among the longer lasting.
Industry insiders and World Bank experts agree that the cof-
fee industry is undergoing fundamental changes that will pre-
vent prices from rebounding to previous heights anytime soon.
Vietnam’s increased role in coffee production has implications
that go beyond the cultivation-and-price roller coaster. It is a
move that signifies a shift towards growing cheaper coffee in a
lower-cost region—not unlike the way that American manu-
facturing moved first from the Northeast to the South, and then
abroad. 
“The costs of production range from country to country, per-
haps from 60 to 90 cents for a pound of the arabica variety,” says
Equal Exchange’s Rob Everts. But Vietnam faces costs well be-
low this range. Labor is cheaper in Vietnam and, moreover, the
bulk of the country’s coffee production is comprised of the ro-
busta variety, which is significantly less expensive to grow. As
its name indicates, robusta tends to be more resistant both to
hot weather and diseases—requiring fewer pesticides. It can be
grown at lower elevations, with flatter terrain, and the trees have
higher yields. 
Beyond the lower-cost issue, the expansion of robusta in the
market has the effect of dragging down the prices of most oth-
er varieties of coffee. “Robusta beans are noteworthy for their
harsh, dirty flavor and abundant caffeine—twice as much caf-
feine, in fact, as is found in arabica beans,” write Kevin Knox
and Julie Sheldon Huffaker, authors of Coffee Basics. Their in-
ferior taste means robusta beans sell well below the price com-
manded by standard arabicas. But roasters are able to substi-
tute the cheaper beans into their blends—up to a certain
point—before consumers notice or react to the difference in
quality. According to World Bank economist Panos Varangis,
the share of the more expensive mild arabicas in blends has fall-
en from 50 percent in 1989 to about 35 percent in 2001. At the
same time, robustas and (cheaper) natural arabicas have seen
their shares increase. If this change persists, coffee prices could
remain low, at least for the near future.
Those hardest hit are Latin American countries with rela-
tively high production costs. These countries can try to find
ways to lower their costs or find niche markets that command
price premiums, such as organic or environmentally friendly
shade-grown coffees that provide
needed habitats to migratory birds.
But such options will not help every-
one. Many growers will ultimately
have to move to other more lucrative
products.
In the current price slump,
enough farmers will eventually be
driven out of business that the price
of coffee will likely rise again. That
means another potential shortage is
looming in the future, particularly for
the higher-quality coffees that are
more costly to produce. And this
shortage may drive prices high
enough to encourage overproduction
once again.
It is not clear whether, or perhaps
more aptly, when, this damaging cy-
cle will repeat itself. What is clear is
that new and better solutions are
needed to help diminish the human
price, a price that is now being paid
mostly by the most vulnerable work-
ers in already poor countries. S
The coffee that goes into a cup costs only about a dime, even for high-qua
the priceroller coaster
The supermarket-aisle price of roasted coffee goes up and down with
the international price. But because retail prices are higher overall,
changes in the international price are much larger in percentage terms.
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